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  One of the primary motivations offered by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) for its 
quantitative easing program -- whereby it maintained a current account balance target in 
excess of required reserves, effectively pegging short-term interest rates at zero --  was to 
maintain credit extension by the troubled Japanese financial sector.  We conduct an event 
study concerning the anticipated impact of quantitative easing on the Japanese banking 
sector by examining the impact of the introduction and expansion of the policy on 
Japanese bank equity values.  We find that excess returns of Japanese banks were greater 
when increases in the BOJ current account balance target were accompanied by “non-
standard” expansionary policies, such as raising the ceiling on BOJ purchases of long-
term Japanese government bonds.  We also provide cross-sectional evidence that suggests 
that the market perceived that the quantitative easing program would disproportionately 
benefit financially weaker Japanese banks.    
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1. Introduction 
  Convinced that Japan’s economic fundamentals were too severely distressed to be 
rectified with standard monetary policy measures, on March 19, 2001 the Bank of Japan 
announced a new policy of “quantitative easing.”  Under this policy, the BOJ increased 
its current account target far beyond the level of commercial bank required reserves.  
This had the expected impact of reducing the already-low overnight call rate effectively 
to zero.  In addition, the BOJ committed to maintain the policy until the core consumer 
price index registered “stably” a zero percent or an increase year on year. The policy was 
in place for almost five years, being formally lifted on March 9, 2006. 
  In motivating the policy change, the minutes of the policy meeting [BOJ (2001b)]  
revealed that the Policy Board had paid particular attention to financial market 
conditions, including the adjustment associated with commercial bank disposal of non-
performing loans and the recent downgrading of the credit of 19 Japanese banks by a 
major rating agency.  In particular, the Policy Board members acknowledged the disjoint 
between the laudable goal of cleaning Japanese bank balance sheet of problem loans and 
of the need for accelerated credit creation by Japanese banks. 
  Given these considerations, a primary goal of the BOJ’s quantitative easing 
program was clearly to provide assistance to the nation’s troubled banking sector.  In this 
paper, we examine the market’s perception of the ability of quantitative easing policy to 
achieve such goals by conducting event studies concerning the announcements of the 
introduction and expansion of the quantitative easing policy.  
  The ability of quantitative easing to have an impact on the banking sector is 
controversial.  Given that Japanese interest rates were already low at the launch of the 2 
policy, many authors [e.g. Eggertson and Woodford (2003)] were skeptical that any of 
the components of the quantitative easing policy could have real effects, even the so-
called “non-standard components,” such as increasing the ceiling on BOJ purchases of 
Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs).  Subsequent to the implementation of the policy, 
many characterized the policy as a failure, pointing out that overall Japanese bank 
lending actually declined over the period in which the policy was implemented and 
expanded, despite the rapid growth in narrow money that took place [Kimura, et al 
(2002)].  Still, the fact that banks were under pressure to enhance their financial positions 
during this period by disposing of problem loans could imply that in the absence of the 
BOJ’s quantitative easing program the rate of credit extension could have fallen at an 
even more rapid pace.  Moreover, there is a possibility that if quantitative easing 
succeeded in reducing longer-term rates, it could have disproportionately benefited 
weaker Japanese banks. 
  The International Monetary Fund [IMF (2003)] recently argued that the 
quantitative easing policy has been a mixed blessing for the Japanese financial system.  
On one hand, they acknowledge that low nominal interest rates have had the positive 
impact of stabilizing the sector and preventing an acceleration of deflation.  On the other 
hand, they argue that low nominal rates increase the difficulty of assessing individual 
bank and loan conditions, and thereby slow the process of shutting down problem 
Japanese banks.  The IMF also argued that the flattening of the yield curve associated 
with BOJ purchases of longer-term JGBs has made it more difficult for some banks to 
achieve profitability, rather than less, as net interest margins have declined.  Low nominal 3 
rates may have also dampened activity in the inter-bank call market, which could further 
reduce profits for some classes of banks. 
  There is also evidence that the quantitative easing program has reduced the 
borrowing advantage enjoyed by financially stronger banks. Baba, et al (2006) 
demonstrate that the BOJ introduction of quantitative easing policy reduced the variance 
of certificate of deposit rates across banks, even more than would be expected by the 
observed decline in the variance of bank credit ratings over their sample period.   
  While these arguments leave the ultimate impact of quantitative easing on the 
overall banking sector uncertain, it appears likely, as the IMF has suggested, that the 
quantitative easing policy disproportionately favors weak Japanese banks over strong 
ones. Weak banks would disproportionately benefit from the deterioration of regulatory 
conditions under low nominal rates, and would be likely to suffer less from the reduced 
inter-bank market activity. 
  In this paper, we examine the market’s expectations concerning the absolute and 
relative impact of the introduction and extension of the BOJ quantitative easing policy on 
the Japanese banking sector.  Examining the period from the start of quantitative easing 
in March 2001 to the end of 2004, we identify 10 dates associated with significant 
announcements concerning changes in the BOJ’s quantitative easing policy.  We then 
categorize these events in terms of whether they included only a standard expansion of 
the quantitative easing policy, identified as an increase in the target for commercial bank 
current account balances at the BOJ, or whether they also included other enhancements, 
particularly those that would be expected to have the impact of flattening the Japanese 
yield curve by reducing longer-term interest rates. 4 
  We then conduct an event study examining the impact of these events on the 
overall banking portfolio.  Our results demonstrate that while raw bank returns usually 
responded positively to expansion of the quantitative easing program, the overall banking 
sector experienced significantly greater excess returns when increases in its current 
account balance targets were accompanied by increases in the ceiling on long-term JGB 
purchases.  Indeed, Japanese banks earned statistically significant positive excess returns 
on all dates in our study when increases in the current account were accompanied by 
increases in the ceiling on BOJ purchases of long-term JGBs. 
  We then turn to a standard cross-sectional event study to examine whether the 
quantitative easing policy was perceived as disproportionately benefiting weaker 
Japanese banks.  We calculate the excess returns of 87 Japanese banks on the event date 
marking the introduction of the quantitative easing program, the two event dates on 
which the overall banking portfolio exhibited statistically significant positive excess 
returns, and a later event date that coincided with the introduction of Japan’s financial 
revitalization program, which was widely expected to result in an aggressive cleanup of 
problem Japanese banks.  We find one variable, the rate of time deposit growth, to be a 
robustly negative indicator of bank excess returns at statistically significant confidence 
levels.  These results support the hypothesis that weak banks were expected to 
disproportionately benefit from the quantitative easing policy, as depositors were 
removing time deposits from problem Japanese banks at this time due to the anticipated 
partial reduction in deposit insurance guarantees on these deposits. The exception to these 
results is the later date, which occurred after the introduction of limited on time deposit 5 
insurance. In this case, we obtained a statistically-significant negative coefficient on 
overall deposit growth, rather than growth rates of time deposits alone. 
  Finally, we also provide some evidence concerning the impact of the introduction 
of quantitative easing on Japanese industries and firms.  At the industry level, we 
calculate industry excess returns on the event window surrounding the announcement of 
the quantitative easing policy, and find that positive excess returns were more prevalent 
among financially troubled Japanese industries.  At the firm level, we examine the 
sensitivity of the excess returns of 49 financially-troubled Japanese firms to the financial 
positions of their main banks.  We find some evidence, as anticipated, that excess returns 
were larger among firms with weaker main banks.  Again, this suggests some anticipation 
by the market that the quantitative easing policy would disproportionately encourage 
additional credit extension by problem Japanese banks. 
  It should be stressed that our event study is certain to underestimate the impact of 
quantitative easing to some extent, as changes in bank equity values will only reflect the 
unanticipated component of changes in monetary policy. It is likely that changes in 
quantitative easing policy were partially anticipated, particularly subsequent to the launch 
of the program. However, we can still examine which types of changes were treated as 
positive surprises for bank stock equities. Moreover, we also examine the impact of 
policy changes in the cross section, which allows us to ascertain the relative impact of 
policy changes by bank characteristics.  
  The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections.  Section 2 discusses 
monetary policy by the Bank of Japan under quantitative easing.  Section 3 examines the 
economic arguments concerning whether the quantitative easing policy should or should 6 
not have real effects.  Section 4 examines the empirical evidence concerning the impact 
of the introduction and expansion of quantitative easing on the overall Japanese banking 
portfolio and on a cross-section of banks.  Section 5 extends the analysis to Japanese 
industries and firms.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Japanese monetary policy under quantitative easing 
2.1 The zero interest rate policy  
  The Bank of Japan (BOJ) initially attempted to intensify its expansionary policy 
through standard interest rate reduction channels, by bringing the unsecured call rate 
close to the zero bound.  In September 1998, the BOJ Policy Board reduced the 
unsecured call rate to 0.25 percent.  In February 1999 it reduced rates again to 0.15 
percent and announced that further declines would be steadily promoted.  These interest 
rate reductions were termed the “zero interest-rate policy,” as the BOJ reduced the call 
rate close to its boundary level of zero percent.  At the same time, the BOJ announced a 
plan to continue the zero interest-rate policy until “the situation allows for the prospect of 
the elimination of deflationary concern”. 
  The BOJ abandoned its zero interest rate policy in August 2000. The Policy Board 
[BOJ 2000] reported that “… the Bank of Japan feels confident that Japan's economy has 
reached the stage where deflationary concern has been dispelled, the condition for lifting 
the zero interest rate policy,” and increased the call rate to 0.25 percent.  This reversal 
was criticized by both the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Economic Planning 
Agency (EPA), who insisted that the policy reversal was premature.  The MOF and the 
EPA both requested a postponement of the vote at the Policy Board until the next 7 
meeting under Article 19 of the Bank of Japan Law.  However, the BOJ rejected the 
government’s request to postpone the vote and approved lifting of the zero interest-rate 
policy by a 7 to 2 majority.   
After six months of continued weakness, the BOJ returned to its zero-interest rate 
policy by reducing the call rate to 0.15 percent in February 2001.  Moreover, the return to 
the zero interest rate policy was quickly followed by a set of policies chosen at the BOJ 
Policy Board’s March 19, 2001 meeting, self-described as “… monetary easing as drastic 
as is unlikely to be taken under ordinary circumstances.”
1  The Policy Board noted that 
Japan's economy had failed to return to a sustainable growth path, and again faced a 
threat of deterioration, and concluded that more aggressive policy was warranted.
2 
The primary policy innovation was replacing the call rate as the main operating 
target for money market operations with the outstanding balance of the current accounts 
at the Bank of Japan.  The BOJ initially announced that it intended to increase the current 
account balance approximately 1 trillion yen to a target of five trillion yen.  As this new 
target level exceeded required reserves, the change was intended to ensure that the Bank 
provided ample liquidity to the market, as well as reduce the call rate from its 0.15 
percent level to a level close to the zero bound.  For that reason, targeting the current 
account balance is also sometimes referred to as “excess reserve targeting” [e.g. Ito and 
Mishkin (2005)]. 
                                                 
1 “New Procedures for Money Market Operations and Monetary Easing,” Bank of Japan, 
March 19, 2001. 
 
2 The announcement was after 17:00, which means that the information was not 
reflected by the market prices on March 19 (Monday). March 20 was a national holiday 
(Spring Equinox Day), and stock market was closed. Therefore, March 21 (Wednesday) 
was the first trading day after the announcement. 
  8 
The Policy Board also made a commitment to maintain its new targeting 
procedure until the core consumer price index (excluding perishables) registered “stably” 
a zero percent or positive increase year on year.
3  Finally, the Bank also announced its 
intention to increase its rate of long-term government bond purchases from its the current 
level of 400 billion yen per month to a larger unspecified level, subject to the constraint 
that its stock of long term “effectively held” government bonds be kept below its 
outstanding stock of banknotes.
4 
 
2.2 The quantitative easing period 
  Policy decisions under quantitative easing are displayed in Table 1.  The BOJ 
expanded its current account target ten times between March 2001 and December 2004, 
when the target reached its final upper target level of Y35 trillion.  The increases in 
current account balances were achieved primarily through monthly purchases of JGBs in 
open market operations.  Monthly purchases grew from 0.4 trillion yen in March 2001 to 
1.2 trillion yen in May 2004 [Oda and Ueda (2005)]. 
  The BOJ was generally successful in keeping its monthly current account 
balances within its announced target ranges, as shown in Figure 1.  Still, there were short 
deviations from the target ranges, most notably in 2005, as reports of insufficient supply 
hindering the ability of the BOJ to achieve its stated current account target prompted calls 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that the BOJ did not view this condition as implying that it had 
adopted a formal inflation targeting procedure, as had been requested by many of its 
critics, because it had refrained from announcing a desired long-term inflation target. 
 
4 The measured stock of effectively held long-term bond purchases includes adjustments 
for government bond sales under gensaki repurchase agreements. 
 9 
for reducing the current account target range or eliminating the quantitative easing policy 
and going back to targeting interest rates. 
In explaining its decisions to increase its current account balance target, the BOJ 
usually stressed the need for a liquidity injection into the financial sector.  For example, 
in its explanation of its December 19, 2001 decision, the BOJ noted that “Japan's 
economy is deteriorating broadly and [is] likely to undergo a severe adjustment phase for 
the time being.  Against this background, looking at the stock market as well as the 
markets for commercial paper and corporate bonds, price differentials are widening 
reflecting the credit conditions of each firm. As such, financial institutions and investors 
are becoming more cautious,”  and added that “There is concern that, if the deterioration 
in the financial environment goes too far and adversely affects financing by firms in good 
condition, it could exert downward pressure on economic activity and prices.”
 5  
 
3.  Anticipated Impact of Quantitative Easing 
  The subsequently-released minutes of the March 2001 BOJ monetary Policy 
Board meeting revealed that there was considerable uncertainty among the Policy Board 
members about the impact of quantitative easing.
6  It was generally agreed that the policy 
would quickly push the overall call rate almost all the way to 0, as it did.
7  It was also 
reported that, “A few members were of the opinion that the economic effects of an 
                                                 
5 Bank of Japan (2001a). 
 
6 Bank of Japan (2001b). 
  
7 Indeed, because foreign banks were seen as more creditworthy than Japanese banks 
who themselves enjoyed rates close to 0 percent, the uncollateralized overnight call rate 
actually dipped modestly into negative territory from time to time [e.g. Nishioka and 
Baba (2004)]. 
  10 
increase in the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the Bank were uncertain in 
some respects, but, at the same time, it could not be denied that it might have some 
effects.  Thus, the Bank, in view of the economic situation, should try out the measure as 
long as no significant harmful effect could be anticipated.”
8  However, some of the Policy 
Board members questioned whether quantitative easing would have any impact. One 
member noted that “… since quantitative targeting would not necessarily reduce the 
overnight call rate to close to zero percent, the targeting of zero interest rates had a 
stronger commitment effect.”  This skepticism was driven by the operations associated 
with current account balance targeting.  Basically, the BOJ swapped near-zero interest-
bearing assets (short-term JGBs), for zero-interest bearing assets (claims on deposits at 
the BOJ).  The net impact of such a transaction on bank behavior is therefore unclear. 
The potential for quantitative easing, i.e. expanding the current account when the 
interest rate is already at the zero bound, to have real effects has been examined recently 
in a number of papers.  First, quantitative easing can influence future interest rate 
expectations [e.g. Svennson (2001) and Eggertson and Woodford (2003)], by increasing 
the length of time the public expects interest rates to be maintained at near-zero levels.  
The central bank can also influence public expectations through credible statements about 
future monetary policy, such as the commitment to maintain zero interest rates until 
certain economic conditions are achieved. 
Second, quantitative easing can alter the composition of the central bank balance 
sheet [e.g. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004)].  For example, the central bank can push down 
long-term yields on government securities by purchasing of longer-term assets.   
                                                 
8 Bank of Japan (2001b). 11 
Third, quantitative easing can expand the supply of reserves and the money stock 
[e.g. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004)].  If money is an imperfect substitute for other assets, 
private investors will push down yields on other assets as they attempt to rebalance their 
portfolios towards those assets.  In addition, if the central bank replaces interest-bearing 
government debt with non-interest bearing currency, quantitative easing can have an 
expansionary fiscal impact, as demonstrated by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003).  
Most would consider the potential for “non-standard” expansionary policy at the 
zero bound, such as purchases of longer-term securities or other non-standard assets, to 
succeed in having an expansionary impact to be greater than the potential for expansion 
through increases in the current account target alone [e.g. Orphanides (2004)].  As 
mentioned above, the Bank of Japan pursued such non-standard policies in a number of 
dimensions over the course of the quantitative easing era.  In particular, the ceiling on 
purchases of long-term JGBs was increased  4 times, from an initial limit of 400 billion 
yen to a limit currently of 1.2 trillion yen.  In addition, the BOJ increases the maturity 
limit on bills purchased, and then subsequently renewed the extension. 
However, there is even uncertainty about the potential for these non-standard 
policies to have any tangible impact.  For example, purchases of longer-term securities do 
not affect long-term interest rates in Eggertson and Woodford’s (2003) model if they do 
not change expectations about future interest rate levels.  Moreover, Eggertson and 
Woodford argue that empirical evidence suggests that the effect of changes in the 
composition of public debt on relative yields is small.
9  Shirakawa (2002) confirms that 
                                                 
9 Much of the empirical argument against the potential for manipulating the term structure through 
open market operations is based upon the perceived lack of success of “Operation Twist,” launched 
under the Kennedy Administration in the United States in an effort to flatten the yield curve.  However, 
as Bernanke, et al (2004) point out, the operation was relatively small, leaving the experience 12 
the impact of both increases in quantitative easing and outright purchases of long-term 
securities have had little impact on long-term Japanese interest rates. 
Empirical evidence about the success of the quantitative easing program has been 
mixed.  Using an event study framework, Bernanke et al (2004) fail to find any evidence 
of an impact of policy statements by the Bank of Japan on expectations of future 
monetary policy.  However, the same authors find that bond yields in Japan during the 
quantitative easing period were significantly lower than they would have been predicted 
to be by their estimated term-structure model, suggesting that quantitative easing may 
have had real effects. 
The more central question to our analysis is the anticipated impact of quantitative 
easing on the financial sector.  To understand what the anticipated impact would be on 
commercial banks, it is useful to begin by considering the question of why commercial 
banks would be willing to hold such large quantities of current account balances at the 
BOJ.  The current account balances maintained by the BOJ have far exceeded the 
required reserves faced by Japanese commercial banks, on an order of magnitude of 
approximately Y 25 trillion.  
There are a number of theoretical reasons why banks might be willing to hold 
excess reserves.  First, banks may be interested in securing liquidity, both currently and 
in the future.  Maeda, et al (2005) report that counterparties bid in open market operations 
more actively when there is greater uncertainty about their liquidity needs.  Second, 
trading in JGBs with the BOJ can achieve desired portfolio rebalancing.  The quantity of 
bidding motivated by portfolio rebalancing needs is greater when financial markets are 
                                                                                                                                                 
questionable as a basis for assessing the potential for manipulating the yield curve through purchases 
of longer maturity assets. 13 
particularly volatile. Precautionary demand for liquidity by banks may also allow 
expansion of current account balances to affect the risk tolerance and willingness to lend 
of commercial banks.  For example, Shirakawa (2002) noted that while demand for 
excess reserves fell soon after the September 2001 terrorist attack in most developed 
countries, demand stayed high in Japan due to concerns over corporate bankruptcies and 
falling equity prices.  He notes that the introduction of the Lombard-type lending facility 
by the BOJ in particular might have had an expansionary impact on bank risk tolerance.  
Kimura et al (2002) also argue that easing liquidity could have a stabilizing impact on 
financial markets and perhaps induce a portfolio shift resulting in credit creation.  
However, there is still relatively little empirical evidence that would suggest real 
effects from quantitative easing. Romer (1992) finds that the end of the United States 
great depression was largely attributable to increases in the money supply, suggesting 
that policies analogous to quantitative easing played a role in ending that episode.  While 
Oda and Ueda (2005) find some evidence that increases in the BOJ current account 
balances were associated with greater credibility of the zero interest rate policy, they find 
no significant impact on bond risk premia at medium and long-term maturities.  
Still, the consensus is that the quantitative easing policy failed to increase overall 
bank lending, as it decreased over the quantitative easing period while the money stock 
grew at around a 3% rate [Kimura et al (2002)].  Nevertheless, quantitative easing could 
have had a disproportionate impact on certain types of banks, particularly weaker 
Japanese banks. The International Monetary Fund (2003) has argued that by pushing 
down the yield curve to historic lows, the BOJ disproportionately assisted problem banks 
and delayed the needed consolidation of the Japanese banking industry. 14 
 
4. Empirical Evidence 
4.1 Return on overall banking portfolio 
In this section, we examine the impact of changes in the BOJ quantitative easing 
policy on Japanese bank equity values.  We pursue an event study approach, 
concentrating on the impact of decisions expanding the scope of the BOJ’s quantitative 
easing efforts from the inception of the program in March 2001 through the end of 2004. 
We examine both the overall return to the banking sector as well as its excess 
return according to a standard capital asset pricing model specification.  It is possible that 
bank equity values could respond to increases in the intensity of quantitative easing over 
and above the response levels of the market as a whole.
10  If this is the case, we are 
interested in identifying the components of changes in quantitative easing policy that 
disproportionately benefited the banking sector.  Towards that end, we estimated a simple 
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where  t BANK  represents the daily stock return of the TOPIX bank index, Rmt  represents 
the market portfolio return for day t, proxied by the return on the overall TOPIX index, 
and εi,t  is assumed to be an i.i.d. disturbance term.   e γ  represents the sensitivity of the 
bank portfolio to the BOJ meeting announcement represented by the dummy variable 
                                                 
10 The changes observed on our experiment dates could be attributable to other policy changes, such 
as BOJ Governor comments, on the dates that the current account target was raised [e.g. Oda and 
Ueda (2005)].  We proceed under the assumption that the primary event on the studied dates was the 
BOJ policy change specified in the text. 
 15 
, et D .  This variable takes value one on the event date t and zero otherwise.  The event 
dates correspond to the ten dates identified as changes in BOJ policies in Table 2.  
Estimation is done using ordinary least squares with White’s general heteroskedasticity 
correction.  Our estimation period runs from Jan. 4, 2001 through Dec. 30, 2004, and 
includes a total of 983 trading days.    
We estimate events within a single-day event window.  However, the March 19, 
2001 monetary policy meeting decision was announced after the close of trading on that 
day, and the next day was a national holiday.  As a result, we evaluate the “one-day” 
return around that event day as the return on the following Wednesday, March 21 (see 
Figure 2).   
Our initial results are shown in Table 2.  First, we note that the raw return on these 
dates on which the quantitative easing policy was expanded was generally positive.  The 
raw return on the banking index was positive 7 out of the 10 event dates, with an average 
daily raw return to the TOPIX banking portfolio of 2.7%.  However, these dates all 
corresponded to positive returns for the market index as well, as the overall market 
responded positively to the extension of the quantitative easing policy.  The average 
TOPIX return on one of these event dates was 1.8%.  In addition, the bank portfolio is 
estimated to be very sensitive to the return on the market portfolio, with a point estimate 
for β  equal to 1.218.
11 
                                                 
11 To compare the effects of quantitative easing to more standard monetary policy changes in the 
neighborhood of zero rates, we examined the return on the TOPIX banking portfolio on 2/15/1999 and 
8/14/2000, the dates corresponding to the beginning and ending of the first zero interest rate policy 
period. We obtained very insignificant coefficient estimates of 0.004 and 0.005 respectively on these 
dates, suggesting that these more standard monetary policy changes were not perceived to have as 
strong an impact on bank equity values as we obtain in this study for some of our event dates. These 16 
The highest individual event day excess returns, of 2.8 and 2.6 percent 
respectively, occurred on August 14, 2001 and the change subsequent to the meeting on 
December 19, 2001.  These were both dates where in addition to increasing the target for 
BOJ current account balances, the ceiling on BOJ purchases of long-term JGBs was also 
increased.  On the two later event dates when the ceiling was raised, February 28, 2002 
and October 30, 2002, we also obtained statistically significant positive point estimates 
for the daily excess returns on the bank portfolio of 0.5% and 0.8% respectively.  
Japanese banks therefore earned statistically significant positive excess returns on all 
dates when the BOJ raised both the current account balance target and the ceiling on 
purchases of long-term JGBs.  
In contrast, there were five event dates where current account balances were 
increased but ceilings on long-term JGBs were not increased.  On three of these five dates, 
Japanese banks earned negative excess returns that were statistically significant at at least 
a five percent confidence level.   The average return on these five dates was only 0.1%, 
far below the average for the ten event dates. 
The results suggest that banks disproportionately benefited, i.e. achieved 
statistically measurable positive excess returns, when in addition to raising its current 
account balance the BOJ acted to flatten the yield curve, either by raising the limit on 
purchases of long-term JGBs or by raising the maturity limit on BOJ bills purchased.
12  
Nevertheless, quantitative easing appears to also benefit banks by stimulating the overall 
                                                                                                                                                 
results are available upon request from the authors. 
  
12 A large positive excess return was also earned on October 10, 2003, when in addition 
to raising the current account target and renewing the higher maturity ceiling on bills 
purchased the BOJ committed to continue its quantitative easing policy until the CPI 
registered a 0% or positive increase year-on-year. 17 
economy through, for example, a reduction in future expected interest rate levels.  This 
would impact the overall economy, including banks, but may manifest itself as an overall 
increase in the TOPIX index, rather than a disproportionate return on bank equities.  As 
banks have large market betas, this benefit to banks may manifest itself through an 
increase in the raw return on the overall bank portfolio rather than an increase in bank 
excess returns. 
It should be reiterated that our results only reflect the impact of the unanticipated 
component of the change in quantitative easing policy. As a result, we are likely to be 
underestimating the overall impact of the change in policy. Indeed, for a number of the 
policy changes we obtained significantly negative excess returns on bank equities. These 
results are better interpreted as indicating dissatisfaction in the market with the magnitude 
of the increase in current account balances, or whether or not it was accompanied by 
increases in the ceiling on long-term JGB purchases, rather than a negative impact of the 
policy change itself. 
 
4.2 Robustness Checks 
  The above specification assumed that the market beta was constant throughout 
our sample period.  However, it is quite possible that the changes in the underlying 
financial regime over this volatile period affected bank market betas.  In this section, we 
examine the robustness of our results to including shifts in bank market betas. 
  First, changes in the intensity of the quantitative easing program could also affect 
banks’ market betas.  To ensure that our market beta estimates are not being 18 
contaminated by the changes in BOJ policy, we allow the bank portfolio market beta to 
shift on each event date.  
Second, there were a number of changes in the regulatory regime that could also 
affect prevailing bank market betas.  We identified three major changes that warrant 
attention: On April 1, 2002 limits were introduced on deposit insurance levels for time 
deposits.  On September 30, 2002, Heizo Takenaka was appointed head of the Financial 
Services Agency, a move that was perceived as portending more aggressive regulatory 
efforts at closing failed Japanese banks and cleaning up the financial system. Finally, on 
October 30, 2002, the Japanese government adopted the Financial Revitalization Program 
which set aggressive targets for reducing banks’ bad loan ratios.  We introduce terms 
allowing for beta shifts on the first two of these three event dates.
13  Unfortunately, the 
third event date also contained a BOJ expansion of its current account balance target, so 
the impact of the regulatory change can not be isolated from this other event. 
In addition to the introduction of shifts in the market beta, we also allow for 
episodes of foreign exchange intervention to affect bank equity values. We introduce a 
variable,  t FX , measured as the value of yen sales on date t.
14      
  Specifically, we generalize equation (1) to the following specification: 
  () ()
10 10 2
11 1
tm t e e e m t e t r m t r t F X t t
ee r
B A N K R D RD RD F X α βγβ β βε
== =
=+ + + × + × + + ∑∑ ∑  (2) 
where equation (2) is the same as equation (1) with the addition of the fourth term 
allowing for time-varying market betas, the fifth term allowing for beta shifts on the bank 
                                                 
13 Spiegel and Yamori (2003) find that news concerning potential passage of bank regulatory changes 
in 1998 measurably affected Japanese bank equity values. 
 
14 Source: Ministry of Finance.  All foreign exchange interventions over this period were sales of yen 
intended to depreciate the Japanese currency. 19 
regulatory change dates, and the sixth term allowing for market effects of yen 
interventions.  et D  and  rt D  are dummy variables equal to 0 prior to the date of events e 
and r  respectively, and 1 afterwards, while  ( ) , i ie r β =  represents the coefficient 
estimate on the beta shift for event date i. Finally,  FX β  represents the coefficient 
estimate on the foreign exchange intervention measure,  t FX . 
  Our results are shown in Table 3.  None of the market beta shifters is statistically 
significant, even at a 10% confidence level, with the exception of the shifter for the April 
1, 2002 introduction of caps on insurance of time deposits.  In particular, the coefficients 
on the event dates are quite similar to those with constant β s.  The coefficient estimate 
on the foreign exchange intervention variable,  t FX , is almost exactly zero. 
As neither the beta shifts nor the foreign exchange intervention variable were 
influential, it is not surprising that our results concerning bank excess returns were almost 
identical to those in Table 2. The two largest event dates are again August 14, 2001 and 
December 19, 2001, with returns of 3.2% and 2.6% respectively. As before, the excess 
return estimates for event dates where the BOJ only increased the current account balance 
target were much smaller.  
 
4.3 Parametric evidence 
We next turn to parametric evidence concerning the impact of the different forms 
of quantitative easing on the overall banking portfolio.  Table 1 groups the various event 
dates into three dummy variables.  CA represents a dummy variable that takes value 1 on 
all event dates when the BOJ raised its current account balance target.  YC  represents a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 on all event dates when the BOJ pursued actions 20 
associated with flattening the yield curve.  We include all increases in the limit on the 
ceiling on long-term JGB purchases and increases or renewals in increases of maturity 
limits on bills purchased.   
Finally, LT  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 on the subset of event dates in 
YC  that also involved increases in the limit on the ceiling on long-term JGB purchases.  
The last dummy is almost identical to the second one, and is intended as an additional 
robustness test.  In particular, we are concerned about the extra-normal return 
experienced by banks on October 10, 2003.  As mentioned above, in addition to the 
increase in the current account target and the limit on long-term JGB purchases, the BOJ 
announced its conditions for ending its quantitative easing policy, raising its commitment 
to maintain the policy for some period of time.  To the extent that this policy change 
results in lower expected future short-term rates, it may also be a policy associated with 
“flattening the yield curve.”  Nevertheless, we isolate the events where limits on the 
ceiling on long-term JGB purchases were raised to isolate the impact of this type of 
policy change.  As above, we estimate the bank portfolio market beta jointly with our test 
of the significance of the event dates.  We first test the significance of the increases in the 
current account targets alone with the simple specification
15 
  tm t C A t BANK R CA α βγ ε = ++ +  (3) 
where our variable of interest is  CA γ .   
Our results are shown in Table 4.  We obtain a similar estimate for our market beta 
                                                 
15 Since none of the coefficient estimates in Table 3 for the market beta shifters was 
significant at even a 10% confidence level, we maintain the assumption that the market 
beta coefficient was constant throughout our sample period. 
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of around 1.2.  Increases in the current account balance alone also appear to be priced 
positively with a coefficient estimate of close to 0.9 percent, although our coefficient 
estimate is statistically insignificant. 
  However, many of these event dates included other changes in BOJ policy, 
particularly changes associated with flattening the yield curve through easing the 
restrictions on BOJ purchases of long-term JGB bonds or increasing the maturity limit on 
bills purchased by the BOJ.  To investigate whether excess returns on the banking 
portfolio were attributable to current account target increases or these yield curve 
flattening events, we add the YC  and LT  dummies in models 2 and 3. 
  The addition of these dummy variables markedly reduces the coefficient estimate 
on the current account dummy.  This variable now enters insignificantly different from 
zero.  In contrast, both of the yield curve dummies are economically and statistically 
significant.  The overall yield curve dummy (YC ) enters significantly with a coefficient 
estimate of 1.7% at a 5% confidence level.  The dummy for only increases in the limit on 
long-term JGB purchases has a modestly smaller point estimate at 1.5% and is also 
statistically significant at a 5% confidence level.  
  The parametric results therefore support our results from overall bank portfolio 
returns on individual event dates.  While banks generally did better on days when the 
BOJ raised its current account balance target, it appears that they did measurably better 
when these current account target increases were accompanied by other policy changes 
that could have the impact of flattening the yield curve. 
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4.4 Cross-Sectional Evidence 
In this section, we examine the impact of changes on BOJ quantitative easing 
policy on a cross-section of 87 Japanese banks.  As mentioned above, there has been 
speculation that the BOJ quantitative easing policy disproportionately benefited weaker 
Japanese banks. We therefore examine important policy event dates to examine whether 
or not this is the case.  In particular, we conduct cross sectional analysis on the March 19, 
2001 event date, corresponding to the introduction of the quantitative easing program, as 
well as the two event dates that yielded statistically significant excess returns to the 
overall banking index, August 14, 2001 and December 19, 2001.  Recall that both of 
these latter event dates included increases in the ceiling on BOJ purchases of long-term 
JGBs in addition to increases in the BOJ current account target. Finally, we also examine 
the impact of BOJ policy changes on October 30, 2002, a date that also corresponded to 
the introduction of Japan’s financial revitalization program. 
  As discussed above, changes in bank equity values on our event dates would only 
affect the surprise component of the policy change, and not its expected component. To 
measure the magnitude of the surprise component in the policy changes, we examined the 
change in interest rates on the event dates considered in our cross-sectional tests (Table 
5). It can be seen that the largest change came in on the March 19, 2001 event, the 
introduction of the quantitative easing program, where we saw declines in yields at the 
one-night, 5-year and 10-year maturities of 5, 6, and 8 basis points respectively. It should 
be stressed that due to the low prevailing nominal rates at the time, these decreases were 
substantial in percentage terms. For example, the overnight rate declined by 54% in a 
single event day.  23 
  The declines on the other event dates were not nearly as dramatic. Of course, 
overnight rates were already near zero, so we would not expect much response at this 
maturity. However, on the August 14, 2001 event date we only saw 2 and 0.5 basis point 
declines in the yields on the 5 and 10 year JGBs respectively.  Similarly, we saw a 
marginal increase in the 5-year yield and actually saw a 3 basis point increase in the 10-
year yield on our December 19, 2001 event date.  
  The changes observed in the yield curves, as measured by the differences in the 
yields on 10 and 5-year Japanese government bonds, were similar. There was a relatively 
substantial decline in the steepness of the yield curve on the March 19, 2001 introduction 
of the quantitative easing program, with the difference between the two yields declining 
by three basis points, but on the subsequent two event dates, the yield curve actually 
steepened modestly. Given the concentration on the policy concerning the ceiling of 
purchases of long-term JGBs at the BOJ, it seems surprising that these policy changes 
affected bank equity values as a group but not prevailing long-term interest rates.
16  
  We again evaluate the excess return on bank i on date t in terms of a capital 
asset pricing model 
  it it i i mt AR R R α β = −−  (4) 
 where it AR  is the estimated excess return of bank i on date t and i α  and  i β  are 
estimated market model parameters, and  mt R  is again the rate of return of the market 
portfolio on day t, proxied by the return on the TOPIX index.  We estimate the market 
                                                 
16 Long-term interest rates could have risen and the yield curve could have steepened more than it 
did in the absence of the policy change, but a formal test of this hypothesis would require a structural 
model, as in Bernanke, et al (2004), and be beyond the scope of our study. 
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model parameters over our entire sample.
17  There were 87 banks that traded 
continuously over this period, which determined our sample size.  All stock price data 
was obtained from the Toyo Keizai Shinposha stock price data set. 























where  i σ is the residual standard error from our market model estimation and  mt R  is the 
mean return on the market portfolio during the estimation period.  
  We next turn to the implications of bank characteristics for observed excess 
returns.  In particular, we concentrate on indicators of firm financial conditions.  If the 
quantitative easing policy was expected to disproportionately favor financially weak 
firms, we would expect indicators of relatively poor financial conditions to obtain a 
positive coefficient.  Individual bank data was obtained from the Japanese Bankers 
Association Analysis of financial statements of all banks, individual bank financial 
reports, and the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ) web site.
18 
  We include seven indicators of individual bank financial conditions in our 
specifications:  First, we include bank Liquidity ratios, measured as the ratio of cash, 
reserve, and call loans to total bank assets.  We also include bank Bad loan ratios, 
                                                 
17 As a robustness check, we also estimated the market model parameters for the March 
19, 2001 event using 100 daily returns beginning 120 trading days before the event day 
( ] 21 , 120 [ − − ∈ t ).  These results were very similar to those reported, and are available 
from the authors on request. 
 
18 The DICJ web site address is http://www.dic.go.jp/english/index.html. 25 
measured as the ratio of non-performing loans requiring risk management, as defined by 
the Japanese Banking Law, to net bank assets.  We include measures growth in overall 
and time deposits relative to the previous fiscal year, labeled Deposit growth and Time 
deposit growth respectively.  We include a dummy variable, International operations, 
which takes value 1 if a bank is engaged in international operations and 0 otherwise.  We 
also include a dummy variable labeled Dividend, which takes value 1 if banks failed to 
pay the median level of dividends paid by their regulatory class in the previous fiscal year 
and 0 otherwise.
19  We include a dummy variable, Public funds, which takes value 1 for 
banks which have received public funds and value 0 otherwise.  Finally, we include a 
dummy variable Bank Type, which takes value 1 if a bank is a city or trust bank. 
  Under the hypothesis that the quantitative easing program was expected to 
disproportionately benefit weaker commercial banks, we would expect a positive 
coefficient on the Bad loan ratio and Dividend variables, which both indicate financial 
distress, and a negative coefficient on the liquidity ratio, Deposit growth and Time deposit 
growth variables. 
  The Time deposit growth variable, in particular, may be an indicator of financial 
strength for the events we consider in our cross-section study.  In 2001 the Japanese 
government announced a plan to replace its total deposit insurance guarantees by March 
2002 with a partial deposit insurance system, where coverage would be limited to 10 
million yen per depositor on time deposits.  This reduction in insurance coverage was 
referred to locally as the "pay-off" policy.  The public responded to the announcement by 
reallocating their savings portfolios towards demand deposits prior to the announced date 
                                                 
19 Median dividend payouts for City and Trust banks was 7 yen a share, while median payouts for 
regional banks was 5 yen a share. 26 
of the policy change:  Demand deposits increased from 139 trillion yen in March 2000 to 
152 trillion yen in March 2001, while time deposits decreased from 282 trillion yen to 
278 trillion yen.  In addition, while aggregate deposits grew over this period, several 
notable banks that subsequently failed experienced sharp deposit declines.  Spiegel and 
Yamori (2006) find that time deposit growth was related to financial strength during this 
period for Japanese regional banks that had adopted market price accounting. 
Our expected sign on the International operations and the Public funds variables 
are unclear.  Involvement in International operations usually implies a larger bank with 
branches abroad, which would tend to be a safer bank.  However, during our event period, 
large banks were known to be heavily dependent on the deferred tax assets in their 
balance sheets, and therefore were under greater pressure to liquidate their problem loans.  
Nevertheless, we condition for international operations because involvement in 
international operations subjects Japanese banks to a higher capital standard. 
The expected sign on the Public funds variable is unclear because of the 
restrictions that accompanied acceptance of public funds. On one hand, an injection of 
public funds would directly enhance a bank’s balance sheet. However, banks accepting 
public funds were required to follow the government’s “Business Revitalization Plan,” 
which required large decreases in bank officers and branches, as well as increased 
lending to small firms. Shimizu (2006) finds that the adverse impact of these regulatory 
burdens on average outweighed their benefits. 
In addition we added a variable for bank size, Scale, measured as the log of total 
bank assets. It appears likely that several of the variables in our specification already 
implicitly proxy for bank size, such as International operations and Bank Type, but we 27 
report our results with and without the additional Scale variable as a robustness check. 
The results are shown in Table 6.  We first report our results without the inclusion 
of the Scale variable. For the March 19
th event date, four variables enter significantly at 
the 10% confidence level or better.
20  These include the Bad loan ratio variable, which 
enters significantly at a 5% confidence level with its expected positive coefficient, and 
the time deposit growth variable, which also enters at a 5% confidence level with its 
expected negative sign.  These results suggest that the market expected the quantitative 
easing program to disproportionately benefit banks in poor financial condition and banks 
that had been losing, or at least not gaining, time deposits. 
The two variables with uncertain expected coefficient signs both enter 
significantly at a 10% confidence level.  The International operations variable enters 
negatively, suggesting that banks uninvolved in international operations were expected to 
benefit more from the quantitative easing policy.  This would be in line with the notion 
that banks with international operations would tend to be larger banks with less financing 
difficulties holding all else equal.  The Public Funds variable also enters negatively, 
suggesting that banks that received public funds were expected to fare better under 
quantitative easing.   
We also examine cross-section event studies for the two event dates that result in 
statistically significant positive excess returns on the overall banking portfolio, August 
14, 2001 and December 19, 2001.  On the August 14
th date, two of the variables enter 
significantly.  The time deposit growth variable again enters significantly at a 5% 
                                                 
20 Of the 87 banks in our sample, 27 exhibited positive excess returns on the March 19 
event date at a 10% confidence level or stronger, while only two had measurably negative 
excess returns. 
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confidence level with its expected negative sign, suggesting that the market expected that 
quantitative easing would disproportionately benefit banks with difficulties raising 
deposits.  The Dividend variable also entered at a 1% confidence level with the incorrect 
negative sign.  This would suggest that banks that failed to meet the median dividend 
payout of their regulatory class would be expected to disproportionately benefit less from 
the quantitative easing program than other Japanese banks.  As only problem banks tend 
to miss their dividend payments, this result conflicts with the hypothesis that the 
quantitative easing program was expected to disproportionately benefit weaker Japanese 
banks. 
The Time deposit growth variable also enters significantly with its expected 
negative sign on our December 19 event date, again at a 5% confidence level.  In 
addition, the overall deposit growth variable entered significantly positive at a 5% 
confidence level.  This is not the anticipated sign, but the results for overall deposits may 
reflect anticipation (which proved to be true) that the removal of deposit insurance on 
demand deposits would be delayed.
21 
Adding the Scale variable does not appear to qualitatively change our results. The 
variable itself only enters significantly on the March 19, 2001 event date. The set of 
variables that enter significantly on the event dates studied are largely invariant to the 
inclusion of this variable, with the notable exception of the Time deposit growth variable 
on the March 19 event date, which fails to enter significantly when the Scale variable is 
included, although it still enters with its expected negative sign. 
                                                 
21 Spiegel and Yamori (2006) fail to find evidence of depositor discipline in terms of 
overall deposit growth. 29 
Finally, we also report results for the October 30, 2002 event date. This date is 
distinct from the others in two aspects: First, it occurred after the March 2001 
introduction of limits to deposit insurance on time deposits, so depositors may have 
already made their deposit reallocations in anticipation of the introduction of ceilings on 
deposit insurance. Second, the introduction of Japan’s financial revitalization program 
was also announced on this date. It was widely perceived that this program would require 
banks to aggressively address their problem loans, a burden that would disproportionately 
fall on weaker Japanese banks.  
Our results are notably different from the other event dates. First, time deposit 
growth rates no longer enter significantly, while overall deposit growth rates do with a 
statistically significant negative coefficient. This result would be consistent with 
quantitative easing having disproportionately beneficial impacts on weaker Japanese 
banks if depositors were now moving all deposits out of weaker Japanese banks. Still, it 
seems surprising that we obtained negative coefficients on deposit growth at all, given the 
potential that the regulatory reforms also introduced on that date would broadly be 
perceived as negative news for weaker Japanese banks.  Still, the reforms were primarily 
applied to larger banks, while our sample is predominantly regional banks that were 
largely unaffected by the reforms. 
 
5. Impact on industries and firms 
Given that our results suggest that quantitative easing disproportionately benefited 
weaker banks, it seems natural to ask whether weaker firms also disproportionately 
benefited from the policy.  To investigate this question, we next turn to the impact on 30 
Japanese equities sorted by industry.  We use indices of weighted equity values for 32 
industries calculated by the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  As above we estimate individual 
industry excess returns according to the CAPM model in equation (3).   
Our results are shown in Table 7.  Ten of the industries enter significantly 
positively at a least a 10% confidence level, including Pharmaceuticals, Electric Power 
and Gas, Retail Trade, Air Transportation, Land Transportation, Foods, Metal Products, 
Real Estate, Fishery, Agriculture and Forestry, and Construction.  A number of these 
industries experienced significant financial difficulties during this period, particularly the 
construction industry, the real estate industry and the retail trade industry.  In addition, a 
number of the other industries that experienced significantly positive excess returns on 
our event date were highly indebted, including the Electric Power and Gas, Land 
Transportation, and Air Transportation industries.  Both of these conditions suggest 
conditions of financial distress, and their positive excess returns on our event date suggest 
that the quantitative easing policy was indeed expected to disproportionately benefit 
weaker industries.  In contrast, there were four industries that experienced significantly 
negative excess returns on our event date.  These include Non-ferrous metals, Electric 
Appliances, Precision Instruments, and Securities.  These industries do not seem to be 
notably troubled, with the possible exception of the securities industry.  
  Finally, we also examined the performance of individual firms on our event date. 
As in the case of Japanese industry, we would expect that problem firms would 
disproportionately benefit from quantitative easing, as they would be more sensitive to 
any resulting changes in longer-term interest rates.  However, another goal of the 
quantitative easing program was to encourage additional lending by Japanese banks. As 31 
Japanese firms are still sensitive to the credit policies of their main banks, we would 
expect the impact of quantitative easing to have the greatest impact on weak firms with 
weak main banks, and the weakest impact on strong firms with strong main banks. 
  To test this hypothesis, we concentrate on a sample of financially-troubled firms, 
identified as firms receiving speculative-grade credit ratings below Baa- by Moody’s 
investment service.  We also limited our sample to firms that had positive trade volume 
for all of the days in our sample window and had a solvent main bank.  In particular, we 
exclude firms that had government-affiliated main banks, such as the Development Bank 
of Japan, agricultural main banks, such as the Norinchukin Bank, and insolvent main 
banks, such as Nippon Credit Bank.
22  
  We regress the cumulative abnormal returns of these firms over the 3/21-3/22 
2001 event period on the financial characteristics of their main banks. Our specification 
includes Capital, the main bank capital-asset ratio, Liquidity, a measure of the liquidity 
position of the main bank, measured as the ratio of cash plus reserves plus call loan 
balances to total assets, and Bad Loan, measured as the ratio of bad loans to bank net 
assets.  
  Our results are shown in Table 8.  It can be seen that only one of the variables, 
Capital, enters with statistical significance (at a 10%) confidence level.  This result 
provides weak evidence that the financial strength of a firm main bank influenced its 
sensitivity to the announcement of the quantitative easing program, with financially weak 
firms with weak main banks experiencing the strongest relative returns, as predicted.  
Still, the poor results for the Liquidity and Bad Loan variables suggest either that the 
                                                 
22 We identify the main bank of each firm using the Nikkei Kaisha Joho (Nikkei Company Report) 
published by Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha.  The book lists banks with relationships with each firm, and 
we identify the main bank of each firm as a bank shown at the top of the list. 32 
dependence of the problem firms on their main banks is limited, or that the Capital 
variable is a sufficient statistic for main bank financial strength. 
  
6. Conclusion 
  This paper examines the impact of the introduction and expansion of the BOJ 
quantitative easing program on the equity values of Japanese banks.  We find that a 
weighted portfolio of the overall banking system experienced statistically significant 
positive returns primarily when increases in the BOJ current account target were 
accompanied by so-called non-standard monetary policies aimed at flattening the yield 
curve, such as increases in the ceilings on BOJ purchases of JGBs. Indeed, in our base 
specification Japanese banks earned statistically significant positive excess returns on all 
dates when increases in the current account were accompanied by increases in the ceiling 
on BOJ purchases of long-term JGBs, while they earned negative excess returns on four 
of the five event dates when increases in the current account target were not accompanied 
by increases in these ceilings.  
We also examine cross-sectional evidence concerning the determinants of 
abnormal returns to Japanese bank equities on several important event dates associated 
with the introduction and expansion of the quantitative easing policy.  Our results support 
the contention that the quantitative easing policy was expected to disproportionately 
benefit weak Japanese banks.  We also find that the policy was expected to benefit weak 
Japanese industries and firms with financially troubled main banks disproportionately. 
  Our results therefore tend to support the notion that quantitative easing may have 
had the benign impact of strengthening Japanese financial conditions, particularly with 33 
respect to weaker Japanese banks.  However, as the IMF report cited above discussed, 
this may not have been an unmixed blessing.  If quantitative easing disproportionately 
benefited the weakest Japanese banks and industries, the policy may have delayed needed 

































(Note) Figure shows monthly average balance of BOJ current deposits as well as upper 





















  Note: Due to the national holiday following the BOJ announcement of the 
quantitative easing policy on March 19, date 0 for this event is set at March 21. 36 
Table 1 
BOJ Monetary Policy Decisions Under Quantitative Easing Policy 
(3/19/01-12/17/04) 
 





Other  Changes  CA YC LT 
3/19/01  Increased Y 1 trillion 
to Y 5 trillion 
Allowed to exceed Y 
400 billion  limit 
  1  0 0 
8/14/01  Increased Y 1 trillion 
to Y 6 trillion 
Increased Y 200 
billion to Y 600 
billion 
  1  1 1 
9/18/01 
Allowed to exceed Y 6 
trillion limit   
Discount rate reduced from 
0.15 to 0.10, and 
maximum discount loan 
term extended to 10 
business days 
0 0 0 
12/19/01 
Increased Y 4-9 trillion 
to Y 10-15 trillion 
Increased Y 200 
billion to Y 800 
billion 
Broadened set of 
acceptable commercial 
paper and asset-backed 
securities 
1  1 1 
2/28/02  Allowed to exceed Y 
10-15 trillion target  
Increased Y 200 
billion to Y 1 trillion 
Suspended limit on 
number of business days 
for discount borrowing 
0  1 1 
10/30/02 
Increased Y 5 trillion 
to Y 15-20 trillion 
Increased Y 200 
billion to Y 1.2 
trillion; maturity 
limit for bills 
purchased increased 
to 1 year 
  1 1 1 
3/25/03  Increased Y 2 trillion 
to Y 17-22 trillion 
(After 4/1/03) 
  
0 0 0 
4/30/03  Increased Y 5 trillion 
to Y 22-27 trillion     1 0 0 
5/20/03  Increased Y 3-5 trillion 
to Y 27-30 trillion     1 0 0 
10/10/03 
Increased Y 2 trillion 
to Y 27-32 trillion  
Renewed extension 
of maturity limit for 
bills purchased 
Commited to maintaining 
quantitative easing until  
CPI registers a 0% or 
increase year on year 
1 1 0 
1/20/04  Increased Y 3 trillion 
to Y 30-35 trillion     1 0 0 
 
Note: Table lists BOJ Policy Board meetings at which current account targets were changed.  
Unlisted meetings included no changes.  Note that we also eliminate BOJ decision on March 25, 
2003 to increase the current account target by two trillion yen to accommodate the new regulation 
that required the Japan Post to begin holding about 2 trillion yen in its current deposits at Bank of 
Japan on April 1, 2003. Definitions of dummy variables CA, YC, and LT are contained in the 
text. 37 
Table 2 
Bank Index Returns on Individual Quantitative Easing Event Dates 
 
 
Event Date  CA YC LT  Raw return on 





on t BANK  
Mar. 21, 2001  1  0 0  0.069 0.061 -0.006** 
(0.002) 
Aug. 14, 2001  1  1 1  0.061 0.027 0.028*** 
(0.001) 
Sep. 18, 2001  0 0 0  -0.001 0.017  -0.021** 
(0.001) 
Dec. 19, 2001  1  1 1  0.031 0.004 0.026*** 
(0.000) 
Feb. 28, 2002  0  1 1  0.013 0.007 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Oct. 30, 2002  1 1 1  0.019 0.009 0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Apr. 30, 2003  1 0 0  0.051 0.030 0.015*** 
(0.001) 
May. 20, 2003  1 0 0  -0.003 0.005 -0.008*** 
(0.000) 
Oct. 10, 2003  1 1 0  0.036 0.015 0.017*** 
(0.013) 




Note: Estimation by ordinary least squares with White’s heteroskedasticity correction.  Estimation period 
runs from January 4, 2001 through December 30, 2004.  In estimation of excess return, constant term was 
estimated to be -0.00 while coefficient on TOPIX was estimated to be 1.218 and was significant at 1% 
confidence level. Estimated R-squared of regression was 0.599.  ** indicates significance at 5% confidence 
level.  *** indicates significance at 1% confidence level. 38 
Table 3 
Bank Index Returns on Individual Quantitative Easing Event Dates 
(with time-varying market betas) 
 
 
Event Date  CA YC LT  Raw return on 




on t BANK  








































Foreign Exchange Interventions   0.000 
(0.000) 
Other Market Beta Shifts     
April 1, 2002 
 





Sep. 30, 2002  Takenaka Appointment to 





Note: Estimation by ordinary least squares with White’s heteroskedasticity correction.  Estimation period 
runs from January 4, 2001 through December 30, 2004.  In estimation of excess return, constant term was 
estimated to be -0.000 while permanent coefficient on TOPIX was estimated to be 1.207 and was 
significant at 1% confidence level. TOPIX returns on event dates are shown in Table 2. Foreign exchange 
Intervention reflects dollar value of yen assets sold in FX interventions on event date. Market beta shift 
estimates show coefficient for dummy variable that equals one on and after stated event date, and 0 on 
earlier dates.  See text for details.  “Other market beta shifts” reflect changes to financial regulatory regime 
during sample period.  Estimated R-squared of regression was 0.605.  ** indicates significance at 5% 
confidence level.  *** indicates significance at 1% confidence level.39 
 
Table 4 
Returns on Banking Index by Event Date Categories 
 
Dependent variable: Raw return on  t BANK   
 
Variable Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 
      






      






      






      
Increases in ceiling on long-term JGB 




      
Increases in ceiling on long-term JGB 
purchases 
   0.015** 
(0.007) 
      
# of observations  983  983 983 
R-squared  0.594  0.596  0.596 
 
Note: Estimation by ordinary least squares with White’s heteroskedasticity correction.  Estimation period 
from January 4, 2001 through December 30, 2004.  Dummy variables take value one on announcement 
dates corresponding to named event, zero otherwise.  Identification of dummy variables is shown in Table 
1.  Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  * indicates significance at 10% confidence level.  ** 
indicates significance at 5% confidence level while *** indicates significance at 1% confidence level.   40 
Table 5 
Interest Rate Effects of Changes in Current Account Target 
 
 
Note: Interest rates in table include uncollateralized overnight call rate, over-the-counter 
yields for five year Japanese government bond, and yield on newly-issued 10-year 
Japanese government bond. TOPIX futures are on 3-month-ahead contracts. Event is 
measured as one day window. 
 
 
Event Date  3/19/01 8/14/01 12/19/01
      
Overnight Call Rate     
Pre-event  0.13  0.01  0.002 
Post-event  0.06  0.01  0.002 
      
5-Year JGB     
Pre-event  0.483  0.416  0.500 
Post-event  0.428  0.393  0.500 
      
10-Year JGB     
Pre-event  1.135  1.300  1.325 
Post-event  1.050  1.295  1.355 
      
10-year minus 5-year     
Pre-event  0.652  0.884  0.825 
Post-event  0.622  0.902  0.851 
      
TOPIX Futures Rate       
Pre-event 1180.5  1167  990.5 
Post-event 1280  1202  995 





Event Date    3/19/01    8/14/01    12/19/01    10/30/02 































































































             
















             
















             
















             








             
# of 
observations 
87 87 84  84  84 84  83 83 
R
2  0.145 0.169 0.535  0.536  0.188 0.194  0.163 0.182 
 
Note: Estimation by ordinary least squares with White’s heteroscedasticity correction.  
Specifications regress cross section of bank returns on bank characteristics on posted event date.  
Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.  * indicates significance at 10% confidence level.  ** 
indicates significance at 5% confidence level while *** indicates significance at 1% confidence 
level.   42 
Table 7 




Industry AR(0)  (%)  t-value  p-value 
Fishery, Agriculture and Forestry  2.12* 1.79 0.076
Mining -2.84 -0.82 0.416
Construction 2.05** 2.42 0.017
Foods 3.32*** 3.85 0.000
Textiles and Apparels  1.09 1.04 0.302
Pulp and Paper  -2.01 -1.29 0.199
Chemicals 0.89 0.95 0.344
Pharmaceutical 7.34*** 5.27 0.000
Oil and Coal Products  0.61 0.26 0.796
Rubber Products  2.00 0.75 0.455
Glass and Ceramics Products  0.14 0.11 0.915
Iron and Steel  -0.66 -0.50 0.621
Nonferrous Metals  -4.63** -2.01 0.047
Metal Products  2.99*** 2.96 0.004
Machinery -1.50 -1.74 0.085
Electric Appliances  -3.11*** -2.95 0.004
Transportation Equipment  1.42 1.22 0.227
Precision Instruments  -6.09*** -4.37 0.000
Other Products  -1.69 -1.24 0.219
Electric Power and Gas  5.01*** 4.37 0.000
Land Transportation  4.11*** 4.08 0.000
Marine Transportation  0.04 0.02 0.982
Air Transportation  4.25* 1.91 0.059
Warehousing and Harbor Services 1.04 0.85 0.398
Communication -3.28 -1.59 0.115
Wholesale Trade  -1.57 -1.26 0.211
Retail Trade  4.92*** 3.40 0.001
Securities -3.71** -2.04 0.044
Insurance 1.55 1.03 0.306
Other Financing Business  1.24 0.82 0.416
Real Estate  2.85* 1.79 0.077
Services -3.59*** -2.79 0.006
 
Note: Estimated excess returns by industry using CAPM model on March 21, 2001.  * indicates 
significance at 10% confidence level.  ** indicates significance at 5% confidence level while *** indicates 




Impact of 3/19/2001 Announcement on Firms by Main Bank 
Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: CAR(3/21-3/22) 
 Estimate  T-Statistic  P-Value 
Capital  -0.03* -1.879 0.07 
Liquidity  -0.51 -0.929  0.36 
Bad Loan  -0.00 -0.066  0.99 
# Obs  49    
R-squared  0.08    
 
Note: Estimation by ordinary least squares.  Regression of cross-section of abnormal 
returns of 49 problem Japanese firms on event date 3/21/2001-3/22/2001 on financial 
characteristics of firm main banks.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates 
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